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Abstrak
Meningkatnya signifikansi Tiongkok dalam tatanan internasional menjadi salah satu topik menarik di
abad 21. Pasca reformasi ekonomi 1978 dibawah pimpinan Deng Xiaoping, Tiongkok menjadi salah
satu kekuatan besar dunia dengan pengaruh yang meluas ke hampir seluruh bagian dunia. Salah satu
wilayah yang menarik untuk diteliti adalah kawasan Kepulauan Pasifik Selatan karena merupakan
wilayah dibawah dominasi Amerika Serikat sebelumnya. Penelitian ini akan berfokus pada 10 negara
di Pasifik Selatan yang mengakui Tiongkok yakni, Vanuatu, Cook Island, FSM, Fiji, Niuee, PNG,
Samoa, Tonga, Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Ketika dilihat melalui perspektif dan teori Barat,
kebangkitan Tiongkok selalu dilihat sebagai fenomena yang negatif. Penelitian ini kemudian
berpendapat bahwa untuk memahami Tiongkok dan perkembangannya, penting untuk mengetahui
bagaimana Tiongkok melihat diri mereka. Dengan menggunakan salah satu ajaran tradisional
Tiongkok yakni Daoisme, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui strategi apa yang Tiongkok
gunakan dalam meningkatkan pengaruhnya di Kepulauan Pasifik Selatan. Daoisme disimbolkan oleh
yin dan yang, di mana kedua elemen tersebut berlawanan akan tetapi pada saat yang sama, saling
melengkapi satu sama lain. Melalui Daoisme, penelitian ini berargumen bahwa dalam meningkatkan
pengaruhnya di Kepulauan Pasifik Selatan, Tiongkok menggunakan kombinasi dua macam strategi
yakni hard power dan soft power di saat bersamaan.

Kata kunci:
Kebangkitan Tiongkok, Kepulauan Pasifik Selatan, Konstruktivisme, Daoism, Budaya dalam PLN

Abstract
The rise of China as one of the great powers in the international politic has been the hottest topic in
the 21st century. Following the economic reform led by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China re-emerges
stronger than ever with its influences covering major parts of the world. One region particularly
stands out since the prior dominance of United States therein, the South Pacific. The study of this
research will be limited to 10 PICs recognising China, Vanuatu, Cook Island, FSM, Fiji, Niuee, PNG,
Samoa, Tonga, Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Under the Western International Relations Theory (IRT)
however, the rise of China is always seen in a rather malign manner. This research, therefore,
contends that in order to fully understand China’s behaviour in the international community, we need
to know how China perceives itself. By applying one of the most famous Chinese traditional school of
thought, Daoism, this research aims to examine the strategy used in the expansion of China’s influence
in the South Pacific. Daoism is symbolised with yin and yang, where the two elements are
contradictory, yet they complement each other. Under the Dao dialectics, this research argues that
China has been utilising a combination of two contradictory elements of power—soft and hard
power—in expanding its prominence in the South Pacific region.

Keywords:
The rise of China, South Pacific, Constructivism, Daoism, Culture in Foreign Policy
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INTRODUCTION
“China is a sleeping lion. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the
world” – Napoleon Bonaparte
Years after the Cold War ended, China has secured itself a place in the emerging power
shelf within the international society. Often perceived as contesting the established
power—the United States (U.S.), the rise of China has left everyone in the world on their
edge, and it is for a good reason. Up to this date, China is still seen as trying to ‘race’—
or at least stood at the same level—with the U.S. In fact, China’s rise is so remarkable
that it got involved in competition with the U.S., which results in the worsening of their
relations (Arif, 2016). In 2018, Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) went as much as
US$13,608 billion, a US$1,465 billion increase from the previous year (World Bank,
2019). Not only America, but China has also taken the position of other countries. China
successfully replaced Japan in 2010 as the country with the biggest economy. Japan’s
GDP which counted for US$5,474 billion was exceeded by China, with US$5,879 billion
(Ratha & Mahapatra, 2014). Moreover, China is currently leading the world’s economy
with the largest both inbound and outbound merchandise shipping. It is no surprise that
China is now named to be the world’s second largest economic power (Gough, 2018).
Along with its economic developments, China also demonstrated impressive
growth in terms of its influence across the world. In 2013, Xi Jinping cultivated a policy
called The Belt and Road Initiatives or One Belt One Road (OBOR). One region that
stands out particularly to scholars is the South Pacific since it used to be dominated by
the U.S.. China is now believed to be one of the biggest donors right after the U.S. and
Australia (Yang, 2009). Some scholars pointed out how the tension between Taipei and
Beijing is likely to be China’s real motive in the region. Under the U.S. influences, the
Pacific Islands countries supported Taiwan as a sovereign country—a rather sensitive
issue for the mainland China. However, with the growing influence of China, countries
within the Islands are starting to have a change of stance. In 2019, two of the Pacific
Islands countries—the Solomon Islands and Kiribati—bailed on Taiwan and switched
over to Beijing, leaving Taipei with only 15 diplomatic partners (Dormido & Jason,
2019).
Seeing how China is setting milestones in different aspect of its rise, the need to
understand its behaviour in a different perspective would be understandable. To use
theory originated in the Western world would be like trying to put the last puzzle piece to
a completely different puzzle. Cox (1981) argued that theory is always for someone and
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for some purpose. Mainstream Western international relations theory (IRT) has largely
dominated the disciplinary discourse (Yaqing, 2016; Saeputra, 2018). The domination of
western IRT was—and still is—so prominent that Acharya and Buzan initiated a project
which seeks to address the question of “why is there no non-Western IR theory?” Though
IRT may pose itself to be universal, it can also be seen as speaking for the West and in
the interest of sustaining its power, prosperity and influence (Acharya & Buzan, 2010).
Drawing from Cox’s argument, Asian have an interest in IRT that speak for them and
their interest (Acharya & Buzan, 2010). This needs to be done since the Global South are
in nature different than western countries (Saeputra, 2018). In the realist argument, China
is always perceived as a threat. This is a simple example of how the use of western IRT
more often than not, represents no one but the West. The conventional Western-centred
IRT is both too narrow in its source and too dominant in its influence to be good for the
health of the wider project to understand the social world in which we live (Acharya &
Buzan, 2010).
Against this specific background, this writing will attempt to examine Chinese
growth and how it successfully positioned itself within the international structure using a
perspective coming from none other than China. Specifically, Daoism as one of the most
prominent philosophical traditions in China will be implemented with the hope that the
way China behaves and exercises its influence throughout the world can be better
understood. Based on the yin and yang dialectics derived from Daoism, this research
argues that China has been implementing a combination of two contradictory element of
power, hard power—as the yang—and soft power—the yin in expanding its influence to
the South Pacific region. This combination is conducted simultaneously, therefore
showing the complementary nature of the yin and yang.
This research will consist of four main parts. It starts by discussing
constructivism—as the only IRT that takes intangible elements into account when
analysing foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, it will provide a thorough discussion on
how culture is linked to decision-making in foreign policy. The second part will focus on
China’s traditional culture and how it shapes China’s foreign policy throughout the years.
Finally, the last part of this research will attempt to analyse how China’s traditional
culture, specifically Daoism, influence its foreign policy behaviour in the South Pacific
region.

194

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 23(2)

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Constructivism and Culture in Foreign Policy
Constructivism first emerged in the IRT in early 1990. Its emergence is often associated
with materialist scholars failing to provide a materialist reason behind the end of Cold
War (Klotz & Audie, 1962). Gorbachev’s new thinking demanded a constructivist
approach to be able to fully understand the cause as to how the Cold War ended (Schultze,
2009). Alexander Wendt, a prominent figure in constructivism, in his book Social Theory
of International Politics contends that the sudden and unforeseeable ending of Cold War
is attributable to the growth of constructivism (Wendt, 1999). Unlike traditional IRTs
such as realism, liberalism, and Marxism whose origin come from political discourse,
constructivism derives from a social theory. Originally, constructivism is not an IRT,
rather it is a sociological theory being applied in international relations.
Ontologically, constructivism emphasis the way norms, identity, ideology, culture
and language shape identity and guide actions (Klotz & Audie, 1962). This research,
however, will centre on how culture shapes state’s foreign policy making. In defining
culture, Weber contends that culture is what shapes our view of the world (Weber, 1949).
On the behavioural sense of culture, Sapir (1994) stressed that culture appears most
apparently in a person’s behaviour pattern. Attempt at linking culture and state behaviour
first appeared in the “national character studies” of the 1940s and 1950s (Lantis, 2009).
Uemura (2015) proposed a cultural constructivist approach to analyse China’s
foreign policy behaviour. Under this theory he contends that when state X and state Y
interact with each other, they interpret the other’s behaviour based on their own cultural
rationalities. The same behaviour may produce different interpretation in accordance with
their own cultural connotations (Uemura, 2015).
Daoism and Culture in China’s Foreign Policy
Among major world players, China’s foreign policy carries a cultural identity due to its
unique cultural traditions. Post-reform Chinese leaders, from Jiang Zemin onwards, have
occasionally cited a Confucian concept in foreign policy statements (Zhang F., 2015).
During the 13th National People’s Congress in March 2018, Xi Jinping incorporated his
thoughts on “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” into the Chinese
constitution. In the context of foreign policy, his emphasis on “Chinese Characteristics”
implies that his government will conduct its international affairs according to China’s
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traditional values instead of adopting Western models and principles (Carnegie-Tsinghua
Center for Global Policy, 2018).
China, along with its long ancient history, produces multifaceted traditional
cultures. These cultures are essentially based on three Chinese primary philosophies
namely Confucianism, Taoism (Daoism), and Buddhism. Even before the modern days,
Confucianism had been used as the traditional philosophy of the Chinese state (guo xue,
国学) under the ruling of Emperor Wu (Lihua, 2013). Not only that, but Daoism has also
been gaining popularity in Chinese culture. Buddhism too, at times, has also been
officially supported by the state. In modern days, these traditional philosophies are back
in demand. This is evident in the growing popularity for classes on traditional Chinese
philosophy, with emphasis on Confucianism and Daosim.
One of the core values of China’s traditional culture seen in its foreign policy is
the concept of harmony or in Chinese, Hexie (和谐). The Chinese concept of harmony is
a comprehensive ideological system which consists of not only values, but also a
philosophy. Furthermore, it offers its own perspective on the world (Lihua, 2013).
Specifically, hexie encompasses principles such as the Tai Chi or Taiji (太极) principle
and the yin-yang dialectics which influence the way human and the evolution of the
society are viewed (Lihua, 2013). This concept of harmony is present in the form of three
main ideas:
1. Seek harmony not uniformity
In the world full of diversity, seeking harmony does not equal searching for
uniformity, where there should not exist any differences at all. Seeking harmony
means being able to unite the universe despite the diversity. Under this idea,
differences will not lead to conflicts and contradictions if harmony is achieved.
Confucius says,
“The gentleman aims at harmony not uniformity (junzi he er bu tong, 君

子和而不同).” (Lihua, 2013)
This idea of seeking harmony rather than universality has been applied in
shaping China’s foreign policy evidenced by its commitment to the principle of
peaceful coexistence and mutual respect amidst a mélange of differences.
Manifestation of this principle can be seen in the adaption of the Five Principles
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of Peaceful Coexistence (he ping gong chu wu xiang yuan ze, 和平共处五项原

则) which consists of: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These values were first introduced
by past Chinese leaders in the 1950s and have been implemented in China’s
interstate relations ever since.
Former Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, in his visit to America back in
2002 elaborated how seeking harmony not uniformity meant the condition of
peacefully coexisting and being able to see past the differences to create a
harmonious world. Differences are seen as something complementary and
supportive. This view was then exemplified in China’s twenty-first century
directive of building a harmonious world, Asia, and China’s neighbourhood
(Lihua, 2013). Moreover, in May 2015 President Hu Jintao presented the concept
of ‘harmonious world’ at a high-level UN meeting (Lihua, 2013).
2. Mutual respect between big and small countries
The fact that China is now one of the world’s rising powers does not mean it seeks
to be ‘worshipped’ or glorified. China’s hexie upholds the belief that bigger states
should respect smaller ones and vice versa. In the Tao Te Ching (Dao De Jing 《
道德经) Lao Tse writes:

“What makes a great state is how it is like a low-lying, down-flowing
stream; the bigger state becomes the centre that tends to all the small states
like the smaller streams flowing to lower streams. The larger rivers and
seas are respected by all the streams because of their skill in being lower
than the smaller streams. Thus, they are the king. Since the larger stream
does not strive to be dominant, the smaller streams and larger rivers and
seas work together.”
This idea is formulated into policy of fostering a benign, prosperous, and
secure neighbourhood or (mu lin, fu lin, shan lin, 睦邻、富邻、善邻). Through
this idea, China stresses on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.
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Moreover, China brands its diplomacy with concepts such as equality, mutual
benefit, cooperation, and a positive-sum or win-win.
3. Proper handling of interstate conflicts
Even under the concept of harmony, conflicts are at times, unavoidable.
However, harmony posits for conflicts to be handled properly and legally. In nonconfrontational ones, conflicts should be handled by peaceful means such as
negotiations and diplomacy. In the contrary, in the cases of violent conflicts,
counter attacks on the basis of self-defence are justified. This view is expressed
in a traditional Chinese saying:
“We will not attack unless we are attacked; we will certainly counterattack
if we are attacked (ren bu fan wo wo bu fan ren, ren ruo fan wo wo bi fan
ren, 人不犯我我不犯人，人若犯我我必犯人).” (Lihua, 2013)

Under the conception of the word he (和), China does not forbid any form
of military force and justifies the use of it for self-defence reason since survival is
a natural goal for every state (Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2018).
In line with China’s conception of harmony is its traditional view of the state of
the international world. The tianxia theory (天下论, tianxia lun) or tianxianism (天下主
义, tianxia zhuyi) emerged during the quest of searching for “China’s International
Relations Theories”. Roughly translated, tianxia means “all under heaven.” Deriving
from ancient Chinese classic, tianxia originally points to the conception of world—
literally all under heaven—as governed by authority of the Chinese emperor as the Son
of Heaven (天子, tianzi.). According to this cosmology, Heaven bestowed a mandate to
the emperor to rightfully rule the Earth (Puranen, 2019).
Taken into today’s context, the tianxia theory posits its own perception of the
international world. Chinese scholars defined tianxiaism as an ideology that challenges
the traditional—Western—international order. The current world order was installed by
the Western based on their historically contingent picture and viewpoint of international
politics. The Westphalian world order along with its main instruments such as national
sovereignty, diplomacy, etc. was enforced, leaving the world with no other option. This
world order is also operated based on the “Hobbesian law” where humans are depicted as
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inherently evil which in turn normalised—even supported—the ever-lasting competition
for survival. Meanwhile, tianxia puts emphasis on oneness and worldness where all
nations are under the same ‘heaven’ in a family-ship relations (Zhao, 2019)
In terms of foreign policy, the relationship between tianxiaism and the Chinese
government is never explicit, yet it is still recognisable. The Chinese government has
never openly used the term ‘tianxiaism’ nor has it ever made explicit quotes from the
theory. However, deeper examinations show implicit references to tianxianism. Under Hu
Jintao’s presidency (2002-2012) the foreign policy concepts of “harmonious world”
(hexie xejie) and a “new type of great power relationship” were instituted. Both imply the
need for a world order in which political units and civilisations coexist peacefully and
respect each other’s unique characters. States, with emphasis on great powers, ought to
promote the importance of mutual trust and always seek for a “win-win” in every
situation. Furthermore, the concepts also underlined the importance of setting aside the
destructive, competitive Cold War mentality inherited by the West (Keith, 2012).
The implications of tianxiaism values in China’s foreign policy is also visible in
Xi Jinping’s tenure. China’s foreign policy during his administration adapted the concept
of “community of common future for mankind” or in Chinese, 人类命运共同体, renlei
mingyun gongtongti (CCFM). Influenced by this concept, Xi sees that along with
globalisation, the international community will only grow closer and that we should let
go of antagonism and focus instead on economic and political cooperation. Even though
no explicit recognition were made, manifestation of the harmonious tianxia can be spotted
easily. Moreover, Xi himself has used the tianxiaism concept of “all-under-heaven-asone-family” to describe the CCFM policy (CCTV, 2017). In details, Xi Jinping’s
statement implied further the presence of the harmonious tianxia concept:
“We believe that despite the differences and contradictions of various countries in
the world, there will inevitably be bumps and collisions, but the people of all
countries all live under the same blue sky and have the same home, and they
should be a family. The people of all countries in the world should uphold the
concept of "one family in the world", open their arms, understand each other, seek
common ground while reserving differences, and work together to build a
community with a shared future for mankind.” (CCTV, 2017)
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China’s long ancient history offers traditional values that are applicable to
modern days. Values such as harmony (hexie) and tianxia are being rebranded by
Chinese government and used as a basis of its foreign policy. Through these
principles and values, China is offering the world other point of view, as an
alternative to the Western-dominated one. For example, under its current leader, Xi
Jinping, China launched the policy of community of common future for mankind,
which upholds the principle that the international community live together “allunder-heaven-as family,” therefore China is always there to promote win-win
cooperation, seek common ground, and set aside differences.
The tianxia value stems from Confucian traditions, which accentuate the
importance of peace and harmony. On the other hand, Daoism provides a relational
basis, as an alternative to the West’s dialectics. Confucianism’s nature of inclusivity
goes along with Daoism since both promote the inclusion of all elements in
international relations to reach harmony and peace.
Daoism which dated back as far as 600 BCE, is one of the most prominent
Chinese traditional school of thoughts. Dao literally means “the Way”, “path” and is
symbolised with yin and yang. Yin and yang are both complimentary and competitive.
On the one hand, the two are competing forces or completely opposite of energy
which constantly work against each other, however, yin and yang complement each
other since the world basically consists of these two elements (Liu, 2006). The
concept of yin and yang does not mean a simplification of the world as a mere binary,
as something good and evil, or light and dark.
Under the Western philosophical traditions, we are familiar with the Hegel’s
dialectics way of thinking. According to this “master-slave” dialectics, one pole
could not exist with the opposite, even with the aims to overthrow or defeat the other.
The contradictions between the two polar opposites simply could never reach
synthesis (Ling, 2014). Meanwhile, under the Daoist dialectics, one pole exists with
the aim to complement the other contradicting pole which in turn produce
transformation both internally and externally. In other words, yin operates within
yang and yang within yin (Ling, 2014). For example, conflict and cooperation are
polar opposite, but they both correct each other’s weaknesses (Rosyidin, 2019).
Yin refers to qualities associated with the feminine such as cold, weak,
accommodating, passive, gentle and soft meanwhile yang represents hot, hard,
strong, vigorous, firm, aggressive, active and strong. However, this does not imply
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that yang supersede yin in terms of value. Each of those traits bears value depending
on the context and circumstances (Ling, 2014). One would not be desiring to be hot,
hard, strong in every situation neither to be cold, weak, and soft all the time. Looking
from this dialectic, we can always see that this world is always the combination of
both elements of yin and yang. Figure 1 represents how the flow of this study.
Figure 1. Mind map of this research

Source: Processed by the authors.

Compared to the concept of hard power and soft power in international relations,
the yin and yang in Daoism are in most aspect, similar. They both are contradictory and
will not be complete without one another. In his book, Nye (2011), specified what comes
under hard and soft power. The use of force, payment, and agenda-setting based on those
two are considered as hard power. Hard power involves tangible resources such as force
and money. Meanwhile, soft power is defined as:
“the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda,
persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes”
(Nye, 2011).
The type of resources associated with soft power often include intangible forces
such as institutions, values, ideas, culture, and the perceived legitimacy of policies (Nye,
2011). Hard power is push, soft power is pull.
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RESEARCH METHOD
This research is a qualitative research which according to Creswell (2008) is characterised
by the reliance on unstructured and non-numerical data. The data is obtained in the form
of field notes written by the researcher during the course of his or her observation,
interviews, and questionnaires, focus groups, participant-observation, secondary-sourced
data and etc. As for the research limitations, this research will be limited to 10 PICs
recognising China; Vanuatu, Cook Island, FSM, Fiji, Niuee, PNG, Samoa, Tonga,
Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Time-wise, this research covered the period from 2006 to
2020. This time scope is determined upon the fact that China intensified its relations with
the afore-mentioned Pacific Islands countries in 2006 which was marked by the Premiere
Wen Jiabao signing off the China-Pacific Island Countries Development and Cooperation
Guiding Framework. Meanwhile 2020 is chosen due to the still-ongoing China’s
activeness in the region up to that date. Moreover, this research used secondary data, in
which data are obtained from secondary sources including but not limited to earlier
research, journals, news, government publications and also books. In other words, this
research used existing data.
These data were collected, summarised, and analysed in order to increase the
credibility of this research. Schensul & LeCompte (1999) defined data analysis as the
process conducted by a researcher to reduce data to a story and its interpretation. The data
analysis used in this study is the illustrative-case clarification method, which is an
illustration of theoretical concepts with empirical evidence (Sulaiman, 2020).
Furthermore, this method applies theory to concrete historical situations or social
conditions and organised data according to the theory. The empirical data found in the
study then filled the empty boxes in theory either by confirming, modifying, or even
rejecting the theory (Sulaiman, 2020). This method was chosen due to its ability to
confirm empirical evidence to existing theory.
DISCUSSION
China’s yang in South Pacific
As described by Nye, hard power is exemplified by the use of tangible material such as
economy and military. China is seen to be using the former element by enforcing a
cheque-book diplomacy in the region. Cheque-book diplomacy, like its name, means
earning diplomatic relations with the help of cheque book or to put it bluntly, money. It
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usually comes in the form of aid, loan, or developmental funding. China and Taiwan have
long engaged in such diplomacy with South Pacific region as the main site. Back in the
1970s when it all started, South Pacific countries had just won their independence and
were extremely dependent on aids. They were yet unable to stand on their own feet and
needed external support, especially economically. Taiwan and China, involved in an
internal clash, saw that as a fertile ground to gain national recognition from the mini states
of South Pacific.
The diplomatic rivalry between China and Taiwan may have begun long ago in
the 1970s, however it seems that it is still ongoing up to these days. China, not showing
even the slightest intention to retreat, continues to shower the South Pacific states with
either loan or aids. As a result, much to China’s dismay, two Pacific Island countries
switched from recognising Taipei to Beijing in the span of a week. In September 2019,
Solomon Island, terminated its 36-years diplomatic relations with Taipei and came to the
decision to recognise Beijing. Four days later, Kiribati joined Solomon Island, leaving
Taiwan with 15 allies. These bilateral switches exemplified just how China has
successfully ‘buy’ its way into the South Pacific region.
China’s aid to the South Pacific states has increasingly attracted attention due to
their increase in number. In fact, China is set to take over Australia’s place as the largest
donor in the Pacific when in 2017, it pledged a total of US$4 billion in aid (Lyons, 2018).
It all started in 2006, in the 1st China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development
and Forum, when China granted a total of 3 billion renminbi (US$492 million) in a
concessional loan to the region (Dornan & Brant, 2014). Ever since then, China’s total
aid spending to the region amounts to US$1.78 billion, where it is mainly disbursed
through three main instruments: grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans
(Bozzato, 2017). In November 2013, the 2nd China-Pacific Island Forum was held in
Guangzhou. The most significant outcome of this forum was the announcement of up to
US$1 billion concessional loans by Vice Premier Wang Yang to be provided over four
years (Jingxi & Zhao, 2013). In addition, China also announced a commercial loan facility
of US$1 billion, financed under the China Development Bank (CDB). However, in terms
of the exact number of China’s aid to Pacific, the Chinese government has never officially
disclosed the amount given neither it provides detail of aid spent each year and recipient
country. Therefore, the data provided are obtained by combing through government
announcement, and financial documents dating back to almost 10 years.
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On one side, grants—accounted for 20% of China’s aid to the region are used
mostly to finance government buildings, schools, and prestige projects. One notable
example is the prestigious convention centre in the Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
(PNG). The grandeur of The Port Moresby International Convention Centre can be seen
by the fact that it hosted the 2018 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). According
to the local Post-Courier newspaper, China spent about US$21.2 million for this project,
and later on gave another US$6.1 million to PNG for the Centre’s maintenance (China
Daily, 2018). On the other side, concessional loans which takes up the majority of 80 per
cent of China’s aid, tend to focus on financing large-scale infrastructure project such as
roads, seaports, and airports (Zhang, Leiva, & Ruwet, Chinese aid to the Pacific and the
Caribbean, 2019). While China is by no means the largest donor in the region, its way of
delivering aids—by funding large-scale infrastructure—makes these projects stand out.
Aside from granting state-to-state loans to the PICs, China is also giving out loans
through a well-funded financial institution with China as the largest shareholder, holding
approximately 30% of the share. The Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) is
said to be paralleling the Asian Development Bank (ADB), not as a rival but as a
complementary (Hannan & Firth, 2016). AAIB is operating based on the value of southto-south cooperation which upholds common prosperity. Unlike the West’s IMF, AIIB is
very open, inclusive and requires no necessity to be met when issuing financial assistance.
As of today, five of PICs—Vanuatu, Tonga, Fiji, Cook Islands, and Samoa—are members
of AIIB, with Papua New Guinea as prospective member (AIIB, 2021). The membership
of AIIB will lead to greater provisions and routinisation of Chinese loans to PICs (Hannan
& Firth, 2016). In the face of the global pandemic, Cook Islands and Fiji, whose
economies strongly rely on international tourism, turn to AIIB for loans as they face a
huge economic sink. The Cook Islands issued a US$20 million while Fiji US$50 million
(Barrett & Menon, 2021).
As to date, China has yet established military bases in the region. Its military
presence, however, is exemplified in the form of military cooperation with PICs. China’s
People Liberation Army (PLA) has been maintaining military engagement with the
military forces of Fiji, PNG, and Tonga, along with Vanuatu’s small mobile police force
(Zhang D., 2020). Between 2006 to 2009, the representative of PLA paid 24 visits to the
region, with more than 60% involved their naval ships (Zhang D., 2020). On top of that,
China has also actively supported the region with military aid. In 2007, China contributed
to the renovation of Taurama Barrack hospital of the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF)
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which cost around US$500,000. A decade later, it supplied 62 vehicles including troop
carriers, armoured vehicle, buses and mobile kitchen vans worth approximately US$5.3
million. In addition, a training of 83 PNGDF officer was also provided (Zhang D., 2020).
In December 2018, China donated a hydrographic and surveillance vessel to the Fijian
Navy. Additionally, China, represented by PLA, granted another 47 military vehicles to
Fiji in 2020. As for Tonga, China provided 8 military trucks worth over US$500,000 in
2008. Last but not least, the PLA also supplied military uniform and vehicles to Vanuatu’s
mobile force in 2016 & 2017 (Zhang D., 2020).
China’s yin in South Pacific
China’s yin is manifested in three forms of soft power. First, by establishing Confucius
Institute and Confucius Class in the region. In the South Pacific, the Confucius Institute
opened at the University of the South Pacific (USP) in 2012. The institution was the result
of partnership between The University of the South Pacific and Beijing University of
Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT) (The University of the South Pacific, 2019). At
first, CI-USP is only available at Suva, Fiji. However, due to the high demand for Chinese
language in other parts of Fiji, in March 2014, CI-USP opened a teaching point at USP’S
Lautoka Campus (The University of the South Pacific, 2019). Not even a year later,
another Confucius class was established at the Emalus Campus in Vanuatu, then another
one in the Cook Islands. Despite the criticisms, CIs are all in all getting positive feedbacks
in the South Pacific countries.
The President of Fiji, Jioji Konrote, acclaimed the CI-USP for providing platform
of cooperation between China and Fiji, or the South Pacific region in general (Yongxing,
2017). In details, he said:
“The Confucius Institute is providing a platform for building friendship and
cooperation between China and Fiji, and the Pacific region. We hope that this will
further pave the way for deeper cooperation based on mutual trust, which is
necessary for the delivery of the social and economic benefits that we all desire,”
(Yongxing, 2017).

Apart from language learning, the Confucius Institute is also actively promoting
China’s culture by organising events which attracted the locals and are sometimes,
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attended by Chinese diplomats. For example, in 2015, the Chinese Spring Festival Gala
was held in Suva, Fiji. The event was attended by Mr. Yang Zhaoui, Chargé d'affaires of
the Chinese Embassy in Fiji. Chinese traditional performances such as dances of Peacock
and To the Spring, etc. had captured the heart of both Chinese and Fijian in Fiji (BUPT,
2015). During the annual “Big Sales Day” of Port Vila International School (PVIS) in
Vanuatu, the Confucius Classroom at Emalus Campus of USP took the opportunity to
organise Chinese-culture-experiencing activities such as paper-cutting and calligraphy.
Red paper with animal patterns and Chinese characters with pictures attracted attentions
from kids and adults, who joined to work out art works with scissors or brushes (BUPT,
2019).
Secondly, China’s yin is expressed by its media activity in the region. China also
utilise media to tell “its friendly intentions” in the region. It combines both its own media
outlet and Pacific’s media organisations to attain this objective. China’s media activity in
the Pacific falls into 3 main categories: 1) expansion of China’s official media, 2) the use
of local media for publicity, 3) media partnership which includes journalism training, etc.
(Zhang & Watson, 2020).
The China Central Television’s English international channel (CCTV-9) has
operated in majority of Pacific Island Countries (PICs). It has established operations in
the Federated States of Micronesia (2002), Samoa (2005), Vanuatu (2005), Fiji (2006),
and Tonga (2006) (Zhang & Watson, 2020). The channel produces variety of programs
including news, documentary and entertainment aimed at international markets
distributed through the China Global Television Network (CGTN) (Herr, 2019). Chinese
media contents in the Pacific are so massive that Australia’s government is said to be
struggling competing with China (Samios & Galloway, 2020). China Radio international
is also broadcasting to audiences in Vanuatu (2007), Samoa (2010) and Tonga (2010). On
top of that, in September 2010, China’s primary states news agency, Xinhua, opened its
first branch in the South Pacific region in Suva, Fiji. This bureau office collects and
distributes news from across the region (Herr, 2019).
Secondly, China is also using local media for publicity, especially in narrating its
friendly intentions in the region. Between August 2016 and September 2020, Chinese
Ambassador in Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM) has published around 92 articles in the mainstream
newspapers in these countries such as Fiji Sun, Kaselelhie Press, Post-Courier, Samoa
Observer, Matangi Tonga and Daily Post (Zhang & Watson, 2020). Figure 6 shows that
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more than a quarter of the articles published were about China’s foreign policy or aid.
Coming right after is Chinese aid with regard to COVID-19 control in the region (Zhang
& Watson, 2020).
Figure 2. News Articles Published by Chinese Embassy in 6 Pacific Countries
(08/16 – /20)

China's Foreign Policy/ Aid

Chinese Covid19 Aid

PRC Anniversary/CPC congress

China - Pacific Relations

Hong Kong

Belt and Road Initiative

China -US Trade War

China's Autonomous region

Climate Change

Source: Zhang & Watson (2020) China's Media Strategy in the Pacific. Sydney: Department of Pacific
Affairs Australian National University.

The third and last activity of China’s media strategy in Pacific is by actively
sponsoring Pacific journalists’ visits to China for training or exchange as well as building
media facilities and bolstering ties with local Chinese media in Pacific (Zhang & Watson,
2020). For instance, China provided trainings to the South Pacific’s journalist by flying
them directly to China. These trainings took place in August 2015, October 2016, and
June 2018. These trainings gained favourable responses from Pacific’s local journalists.
All journalists and reporters interviewed by Herr (2019) spoke highly of the quality and
quantity of the trainings provided by, and in China. Apart from that, the Chinese
embassies is also actively seeking for local media partner to ‘publish the story of China’.
In March 2019, Fiji Daily—Fiji’s largest newspaper publisher—and Vila Times—first
bilingual English-Mandarin newspaper in Vanuatu, established close relations with
Chinese embassies (Zhang & Watson, 2020). A year ago, Chinese ambassador to Fiji,
Qian Bo talked Fiji Daily to help tell ‘the story of China’ to the region.
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Last but not least, China expresses its yin or soft power inside its Belt and Road
Initiative framework. While its main objective is to create an inter-regional market, the
BRI is also used as a platform to allow cultural exchanges between China and member
countries. For example, as a result of BRI in PICs, China started an ambitious PIC
language-learning in Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU). It offers four-year
bachelor courses covering seven languages of BRI’s members in the South Pacific. This
program sealed the approval of the Ministry of Education in 2017 and is aimed to support
the BRI by facilitating cultural exchange between China and member countries (Zhang
& So'oa'emalelagi, 2019). In accordance with this program, Wu Yingjie (2016) argued
that in order to boost China’s soft power, cultural exchanges are crucial in BRI. By
actively expanding cultural exchange, BRI member countries will be able to feel China’s
sincerity in development, while at the same time exposing its traditional culture.
The Simultaneity of the yin and yang
With its burgeoning economic capability, China could have chosen the easy way and just
continuously shower the region with money. However, due to the importance of coimplication of yin and yang, China is aware that applying a single element alone will not
deliver as much results as when both are applied. In Hu Jintao’s words, he believed that
China needs to maintain a balance between hard power and soft power to prevent other
countries from allying against China (Amartya, 2020). For instances, had China focused
solely on hard power (yang), it would not have gained the same amount of favourable
responses to when soft power (yin) is applied at the same time as it adds to China’s
attractiveness to the region. On the contrary, projecting only soft power (yin) will lower
China’s reliability in the eye of the South Pacific countries. This is where the
complementary nature of yin and yang is present. China’s hard power (yang) will build
the image of it being a dependable partner of the South Pacific, while the application of
soft power (yin) will accentuate China’s charm in a benign manner. Fully aware of the
significance of this balance, China exercises an ideal proportion of hard power and soft
power to increase its presence in the region. This part will then demonstrate how Chinese
yin and yang work together simultaneously.
In 2006, Fiji—one of China’s largest partners in the region—was alienated by
Australia and New Zealand following the military coup waged by Bainimarama. China
however remained indifferent and even called for a reasonable and understanding attitude
from Fiji’s neighbours. When other countries hurriedly pulled back aids from Fiji, reports
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show that aid pledged by China to Fiji increased by sevenfold one year after the coup,
from US$23 million in 2006 to US$161 million in the following year (Yang, 2011).
During the same year, China also provided training for Fijian civil servants and technical
staff to China. This training was part of China’s plan that was announced by Chinese
premier Wen Jiabao’s during his visit to the region in 2006 (Yang, 2011). In the same
year when first Confucius Institute was opened in Fiji, China was also providing
assistance for the construction of the Kiuva Sea Wall (Guxia, 2015). China granted a total
of US$2.5 million where a Fijian minister saw this as “symbol of the strong cordial and
lasting relations between China and the government of Fiji” (The Fijian Government,
2013). Moreover, a journalist from Fiji Sun participated in a 10-months China Asia and
Pacific Press Centre Journalist Training Program held by China in March 2018
(Doviverata, 2018). In that year too, China had just invested a total of US$9 million for
the redevelopment of the Suva Civic Centre, which gained huge favour from Fijian
(Xinhua, 2018).
In the case of Cook Islands, a simultaneous combination of yin and yang was also
seen, especially in the year of 2008. During that year, official number of Chinese aids to
Cook Islands was published with details as follows:
-

US$2.9 million economic and technical cooperation grants

-

US$1.1 million soft loan for the construction of education administration
building (Hanson, 2010)

At the same time, China’s media activity was also seen by the fact that the Cook
Islands daily newspaper in that year had more letters and commentaries on Chinese aid
projects and the country’s relations with China than on any other subject (Crocombe,
2010).
Other China’s media strategy in the South Pacific is by providing training for the
region’s journalist to China. In 2016, about a dozen journalists from local media were on
a 10-day tour to China where Vanuatu was represented by the Daily Post—one of the
country’s biggest print media (Roberts, 2016). At the same time, China gifted Vanuatu
about US$28.5 million in the form of 1,000-seat national convention centre (Radio New
Zealand, 2016) (Smyth, 2019). Just recently, China donated in cash US$100,000 to
Vanuatu in light of COVID-19 (Zhang D., China’s COVID-19 diplomacy in the Pacific,
2020). It then published an article written by Ambassador Zhou Haicheng on Vanuatu
Daily Post. Titled “Stronger Together”, this article reassures that China sees the
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pandemic as global challenge and that it will be there to support Vanuatu in battling the
virus (Chinese Embassy in Vanuatu, 2020).
In the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), China is actively using the country’s
local media for publication. For example, in 2020, in response to the global pandemic,
China granted medical supplies and a cheque of US$100,000 to FSM to help the country
overcome the virus (CIDCA, 2020). At the same time, Chinese ambassador, Huang
Zheng, published an article at the Kaselehlie Press—local print media—titled “Engrave
the collective memory and share China’s experience in an effort to overcome the COVID19 pandemic by working hand in hand” in its Vol. 20 (Embassy of The People's Republic
of China in The Federated States of Micronesia, 2020a). Other than topic about the global
pandemic, in 2020 China has also published other issues at Kaselehlie Press as well, such
as when Huang Zheng published an article titled “Facts of China’s Xinjiang Issue
Tolerate No Fabrication.” Through this article, the Chinese government seeks to correct
misinformation and misunderstanding going around in the media regarding the Xinjiang
issue. It aims to prevent FSM people from being misled by distorted facts and allegations
(Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Federated States of Micronesia,
2020b). This aligns with China’s objective of its soft power, which is to correct
misunderstanding and allegations regarding its rise, and to tell the world a ‘friendly’
narrative of China.
Lastly, at the opening of Confucius Institute at the National University of Samoa
in 2018, China was also seen issuing a funding for the upgrading of a port in Samoa called
Asau (Firth, 2019). Samoan Prime Minister, Tuilaepa Sailee said that his government had
“secured funding to widen and deepen the channel” (Firth, 2019). Furthermore, as part of
China’s cultural exchange with the region, one of China’s top universities, Liaocheng
University in Shandong province, started a Samoan language course. This language
course is part of Chinese diplomacy which aims to show China’s real interest to the
region. One of the teachers said, “This opportunity will allow a stronger cultural ties
between the Chinese and people of the Pacific Islands,” (Srinivasan, 2019). Cultural
exchanges were also seen in Samoa’s Confucius Institute at the National University of
Samoa in April 2019, where cultural activities were held. For example, the CI in NUS
organised Chinese traditional festival activities such as Mid-Autumn Festival and Chinese
Lunar New Year (Latu, 2020). In the same year and month, China and Samoa entered
Phase four of the China-Samoa Agricultural Technical Aid Project (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2019). Through this project, China provided
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funding directed to Samoa’s agricultural fields where it is evidenced to be directly
beneficial to the local farmers.
Owing to this combination of soft and hard power, China’s diplomacy in the South
Pacific hit its peak when in 2019, Solomon Island and Kiribati simultaneously conversed
from recognising Taipei to Beijing. Their conversion from Taipei to Beijing is done at
their own will and not in any sense, being pressured by China. Prime Minister of Solomon
Island, Manasseh Sogareh said in a statement responding to his country’s switch, “We
would be simply irresponsible to isolate a global, willing player to assist developing and
least-developing countries” (Clarke, 2019). In the opening of China’s embassy in Honiara
on September 21, 2020, he added how the switch of diplomatic ties to China, has put the
country “at the right side of history, as a member of the United Nation” (Solomon Islands
Government, 2020). Likewise, Kiribati expressed its respect for China. During his first
visit to China in January last year, President Taneti Maamau spoke to Xi Jinping about
how his country “speaks highly of China’s important role in safeguarding world peace,
and promoting common development,” moreover he added, “[we] appreciates China’s
active commitment to the advancement of South-South cooperation and helping small
and medium-sized country like Kiribati to speed up development process and address
challenges such as climate change” (Pala, 2020).
CONCLUSION
Applying Daoism would enable us to understand China and its behaviour better. For
example, the paradox of China’s strategy in the South China Sea dispute can be better
understood with Daoism. As we all know, China puts its sovereignty above everything
while at the same cultivates the good neighbour policy with Southeast Asian countries,
including with claimant states (Rosyidin, 2019). China is persistent in maintaining its
military presence in the area. Speaking at the National University of Singapore, Xi Jinping
remarked that “the South China Sea islands are China’s territory since the ancient times”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). To support its
unilateral claim, China did not hesitate to resort to the use of force. For instance, in April
2001 Chinese F-8 fighter aircraft was involved in an incident with the U.S. unmanned
EP-3 aircraft around Hainan Island. Five years later, China conjointly conducted a
military exercise with Russia in South China Sea. These two cases provide an example
that China is consciously trying to demonstrate its military muscle.
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On the other hand, Xi Jinping underlined the importance of cooperative approach.
China is willing to commit on the establishment of cooperation with claimant states and
major power in any form of inter-states cooperation. China never opts to close the
possibility of negotiation in order to achieve mutual progress (Feng, 2007). One of the
most notable progress is when in September 2016 China and Vietnam agreed on a joint
communiqué related to the peaceful settlement of the dispute (Rosyidin, 2019). In the
multilateral context, China showed its willingness to agree on a COC single text
negotiation proposed in ASEAN-China ministerial meeting in Singapore August 2, 2018.
The example above is one of the many instances where Daoism is apparent. In
line with the dualist nature of Daoism, China upholds the belief that coercive approach is
meaningless without cooperative one. By applying Daoism, we can truly understand the
duality of China’s foreign policy, specifically in South Pacific. The way China is
expanding its sphere of influence to the South Pacific region is based on the Daoism
values of yin and yang. China’s strategy is represented by combining two elements of
power—hard and soft power. Taken into Daoism, yang is associated with masculine traits,
therefore it represents hard power. Meanwhile, yin is linked to feminine traits, thus it
equals soft power. The yang element, is seen in the way China exercises cheque-book
diplomacy where it continuously ‘buy’ its way into the region through lavish supply of
aids and loans. This diplomacy hit its peak when in 2019, China successfully converted
two of Taiwan old allies in the region—the Solomon Island and Kiribati—into
recognising Beijing simply because China could provide more than what Taiwan could
afford to offer. At the same time, China is actively projecting its yin element—soft power
to the region. Soft power is as important as hard power since it is effective to build China’s
positive image as well as correcting existing misunderstanding about its rise.
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